I wonder if we might begin by discussing the milieu in which you developed as an intellectual and critic. Perhaps you could also tell us a bit about your relationship with Raymond Williams, since his working class background and experiences at Cambridge seem in many ways similar to your own.
I cam e from Salford, which is n e a r M anchester, and m y g randparents had com e over to the mill tow ns o f Lancashire as p a rt o f the great Irish m igra tion. D uring the D epression they m oved into the cities and eventually ended up in Salford. So m y p arents w ere first generation English, although still with a strong Irish cultural background. My father was an engineering w orker in w hat w ere th en the largest engineering works in the country.
It was highly unusual in those days for som eone to com e from th at kind o f background, from w hat was th en a g ram m ar school, to Cam bridge. I w ent to C am bridge in 1961 and was, I suppose, thoroughly traum atized by it culturally in a way n o t dissim ilar to the experiences o f R aym ond Williams. In those days C am bridge was even m ore visibly a bastion for u p p er class culture th an it is today. T here was a small percentage o f w orking class students, students w ho w ere very m uch on the defensive, very m uch o f an 1 enclave. Political activity was obviously one way out. At the tim e it would have been m ainly the early nuclear disarm am ent m ovem ent, som ething I becam e involved w ith at C am bridge. T here was also a L abour Club, al though it was ru n largely by ex-public school m arxists-E tonian m arxists!-and so a certain am o u n t o f interesting friction existed betw een, as it were, the genuine "pro ls" and those w ho h ad gone over to their side.
I m et Williams while I was an undergraduate. He had com e to C am bridge as a Fellow o f Jesus College the sam e year I did and he seem ed to m e, as I first encountered him in lectures, to be the only m em b er o f the faculty to be talking any sort o f language I could recognize. He was, to be precise, simply discussing literature in a way I found at once very difficult and unaccustom ed to and yet which seem ed to plug into w hat I felt I knew. So, w hen I graduated from Cam bridge in 1964, Williams invited m e to becom e a Research Fellow at his college and I taught there w ith him until 1969 w hen I left for O xford.
T hat was a very interesting period because it m ean t th at I lived through the various political developm ents in the 1960s really actively w orking with Williams and w ith a n u m b er o f students such as Stephen H eath and Colin M acCabe, for instance, w ho have since becom e well-known. So quite a lot cam e o u t o f th at period. But I think one problem was th at Williams, while enorm ously influential on m y developm ent-and certainly I think he was the single m ost im p o rtan t intellectual, political, and in m any ways m oral influence o n m e at the tim e-had him self had a curious career. H e had been in adult education and com e in from th at to the university fairly late. He had actually been offered a Fellowship on the basis o f his Culture and Society. He never really adjusted to academ ia, how ever, and there was a m o m en t in the late 1960s w hen he had aro u n d him a group o f radical socialist students and critics w ho w ould have very m uch liked to organize som e kind o f interven tion into the C am bridge English Faculty, had he given the w ord. But I think the irony was th a t W illiams him self had had to learn to w ork independently and he was, in a certain sense, properly w eary o f w hat had hap p en ed to Scrutiny. A nd there seem ed the possibility th at a sim ilar situation, although certainly m ore political, could have occurred again and Williams did n o t w ant to be involved in that. T he various people aro u n d him th en m oved off to o th e r places, m ainly the red brick o r new universities in Britain. A nd I m oved to O xford in 1969, partly because I still preserved m uch o f the pathological antipathy to Cam bridge, which I felt from the outset, and partly because, having w orked in a trem endously productive way w ith Williams, 1 w anted to see how I could ru n things on m y own. It was also becom ing clear th a t the C am bridge English Faculty w ould n o t in fact give m e a lecture ship which, in those days at least, was necessary for financial reasons. (As a Fellow o f the College I did som e teaching b u t I was n o t a Lecturer.) Part o f their refusal was, I think, an indirect attack o n W illiams himself, as I was identified with him. He was too pow erful and influential a figure to be directly assaulted, although one o r two o f his colleagues and students were not. In a curious way, th a t was an earlier version o f the later situation know n as the MacCabe Affair, although it never reached such dram atic proportions.
Until about 1968 or 1969, you were clearly engaged with questions orginally raised by Williams in C ulture an d Society and T he Long Revolution. In the late sixties and early seventies, however, you shifted your concerns towards developments within French theory. Would you explain this shift in terms of contemporary political or social events?
Looking back at the tim e it felt sim ply like m oving from one body o f theory to an other, although one can see now the political determ inants o f th at move. As the political scene was quickening in E urope and in the U nited States, and as new bodies o f theory w ere developing, there was a younger generation o f socialists, o f which I was one, w ho then felt th at the older New Left, o f which W illiams was a prototype, was n eith er sufficiently theoretically rigorous n o r sufficiently politically engaged. I think m y ow n m ovem ent tow ards m arxism dates from th at period. Certainly I d o n 't think I w ould have called m yself a m arxist w hen I first cam e to Cam bridge, b u t I clearly w ould have by the m iddle to late sixties. In an interesting way, I think th at if one looks at the w hole trajectory, w hat hap p en ed is th at a n u m b er o f us m oved into w hat we took to be a m ore rigorous and in som e ways m ore politically relevant form o f theory and, from th at perspective, it looked as though W illiams was standing still, o r perhaps even regressing. But it is dangerous to think you have preem p ted o r got beyond W illiams because he has a curious knack of, by apparently standing still, actually holding a position which you end up endorsing, o r at least som e version o f it. A nd it is interesting if one looks at the way the theory o f politics has developed since then: into form s o f French o r A lthusserian m arxism in the late sixties an d early seventies an d th en o u t again in the very changed conditions o f the later seventies. Williams was in a sense prefiguring, in m uch o f his work, the kinds o f positions and form s o f allegiance th at people m ight now find them selves with. I w ould n o t w ant, how ever, to sim ply negate the sort o f critique o f W illiams's w ork th a t I w rote in Criticism and Ideology. I think th at a lot o f th a t critique, theoretically speaking, still stands. But w hat I did n o t see then, an d w hat I have com e to see since because o f developing condi tions, is n o t a m a tte r o f theoretical difference w ith Williams b u t ra th e r ag reem ent w ith the political force o f his work: his attitude tow ards the critic's role in the academ y, his attitude ab o u t w hat literary criticism should be, and even his stance tow ard cultural studies and the need to transgress disciplinary boundaries. All o f th at was strikingly p resen t in W illiams's work, at least in em bryonic form , from the outset. A nd it is those elem ents o f W illiam s's w ork th at people like m yself are now retu rn in g to u n d er different conditions, and they are really m ore im p o rtan t th an the kinds o f theoretical o r doctrinal distinctions th at we had previously. I w ould ju st add, as a final note, th at Williams himself, o f course, h asn 't actually stood still since the sixties either. Williams is m uch closer to m arxism now th an he ever was, ap art from the very brief, an d n o t very fortunate, period o f his active m em bership in the C om m unist P arty as a student. I think th at W illiam s's w ork is, so to speak, effectively an d objectively m arxist work, w hatever label we m ight strategically use for that.
Your valorization of Williams's work nevertheless seems to me surprising, since, as you have indeed noted, Williams works in isolation from not only the academy but also from what might potentially develop into a counter-public sphere. How, then, is he able to be as politically effective as you suggest?
It is a strong p a rt o f W illiam s's im age, th at quality o f isolation. T here is a sense in which he has been a kind o f eminence grise on the left in Britain, and largely w ith very positive effects, although o f course with som e very negative ones as well. But w hat I realize now, m ore strongly th at I did before, is that Williams is him self aw are o f his ow n isolation an d actually m akes this clear in his interview w ith New Left Review in Politics and Letters. His ow n isolation is very m uch the effect o f a counter-public sphere, as it were, failing to come into existence. A nd I was struck by the way he talked, in very distanciating term s, about his earlier w ork in Culture and Society because he identified the political m om ent, the historical m om ent, as being for him very negative. W hat th en happened, as the 1960s and 1970s drew on, was the em ergence o f new political developm ents in which W illiams was involved. Certainly the resurgence o f the New Left aro u n d the peace m ovem ent and the various kinds o f interventions during the period o f the L abour governm ent o f the 1960s w ere p a rt o f this. A nd even today W illiams has played an active p a rt in the organization in Britain called the "Socialists' Society," which is an a ttem p t to organize intellectuals o f various kinds and to p u t their w ork at the service o f the trade union m ovem ent an d the L abour m ovem ent general ly. So he has had th at history o f involvem ent, b u t I think th at at the sam e tim e the sense o f the earlier dissociation rem ained and proved som ething th at he could never truly get beyond. But I think it is interesting to p u t the p roblem n o t only, as it were, psychologically, b u t also in term s o f the failure o f the em ergence o f the m aterial conditions which could have m ade W il liams an even m ore influential figure th an he has been. Yes, p a rt o f W illiams's political isolation, and his isolation in the academ y, was the result o f w hat we m ight politely call a ra th e r civilized o r enigm atic discourse. A nd indeed there w ere ways I took this on in m y critique o f him in Criticism and Ideology, ways in which his very style o f discourse was related to th at isolation. T hat is, som ebody w ho is speaking, and for a long tim e was forced to speak, a language th at was n o t popular, which could easily be m isinterpreted, and w hat was also, to som e degree, a language o f self protection. I am th erefore struck by the way th at o f all his work, Politics and Letters is the one in which he is the m ost candid, w here in the com pany o f com rades, so to speak, he talked openly abo u t his career. O ne o th er point ab o u t W illiams which is relevant is th at I think it is a m istake to search, as often people have done, for the private m an behind the public persona, because W illiams has always b een som eone w ho sees his life in historical term s and in often quite distanciating ways. If there are losses in th at or problem s, problem s o f accountability, there have also been som e gains. W illiams has b een able to solve o r negotiate certain problem s by him self by seeing th em as historical necessities-while never once being fatalistic. O ne o f the o th e r im p o rtan t things ab o u t his w ork as a whole, although it often has a steely realism ab o u t it, is th a t he has never succum bed to the various tides o f fashionable post-m arxist pessim ism, which from tim e to tim e drift aro u n d o u r societies.
It sounds like
An interesting thing about Williams is his attraction for American culture. But there is a tension in his view of America as at once an ideal and at the same time as a certain political reality, particularly vis-a-vis Britain.
Yes, W illiams has b een n otable for his ability to rem em b er the progressive m om ents w ithin the m ost negative o f cultures o r bodies o f thought. After all, Culture and Society was, am ong o th er things, the record o f a highly conservative line o f tho u g h t from which, by som e feat o f dialectics, Williams was able to abstract a positive m om ent. H e has always had th at intellectual and political b re a d th o f vision and, in term s o f his response to A m erican culture, it m arks him off from , say, the Frankfurt School, w here the assum p tion o f a m uch m ore one-sided attitude tow ards contem porary capitalist culture is prevalent. Som etim es I think W illiams has been seen as overcharitable in th at respect, som etim es m oving close to left-liberalism. But then he also has b een from the very start a genuinely dialectical thinker, with a genuinely dialectical cast to his w ork which has always sought to start, as B recht p u t it, from the b ad new things ra th e r th an the good old things.
The concept of the "disinterested" intellectual is ever present in the contemporary academy, at once an ideal, a standard to be met, but also a way of maintaining an atomized university structure. You trace this position in Literary T heory back to the Victorian (<man of letters. " Why do you think this ideal continues to have such force in the present-day academy ?
I think th a t n otions o f disinterestedness begin to crop up in the 18 th century w ith w hat Ju rg e n H aberm as calls the em ergence o f the bourgeois public sphere, and w hat is striking abo u t th at disinterestedness is its obvious in ter estedness. T h at is to say, only those w ho have an "in terest" can be disinter ested, only those w ho have a stake in the culture, w ho are propertied, have a title to en ter into a certain "disinterested" form o f discourse-the whole discourse o f the Enlightenm ent, for exam ple. So w hat one is looking at in th at w hole history becom es visible as a highly elitist and exclusionist class fo rm ation-although certainly one which, like m any class form ations, needs to cast its language in universal term s. T he role o f disinterestedness is m ost forcefully u n d ersto o d today in term s o f th at history. W hat happens with the grow th o f the com m odification o f literature, which was taking place th ro u g h ou t the 18th century, is th a t there is now a sense, because o f the existence o f the text o r w riting as a com m odity, in which literature is in principle available to everybody-w hatever the actual restrictions o f social access to literature and pow er. N onetheless, the com m odification o f literature (and this is a reversion to a dialectical position held by Williams) actually liberates literary production from a very specific range o f interested institutions-the court and organized religion, for exam ple-w hen it was a p a rt o f the previ ous feudalist, absolutist epoch, only to ab an d o n it to the m arket place. Ironically, then, and by a striking contradiction, the very possibility o f disinterestedness as a critical concept, as an intellectual posture, depends upo n a sort o f prom iscuous availablity o f the literary com m odity. A nybody is capable o f judging it, any "g en tlem an" th at is. A nd this situation itself, in turn, is an effect o f com m odity production. If one looks at the history in that way, th en o ne sees w here the so-called disinterested intellectual comes from. W hat I've tried to do in m y lectures and in The Function of Criticism is to go on to trace the destiny o f the concept into the 19th century and beyond. I think th at the great crisis, the crisis aro u n d M atthew A rnold, for exam ple, is, am ong o th e r things, that it becom es im plausible either to believe th at you can transcend sectional and social interests (because the conflicts betw een those interests have intensified) o r to believe th at there is any longer a total body o f social and intellectual know ledge on which intellectuals can get a fix, as it were, transcendentally. A nd it seems to m e th at one o f the problem s th at dogged the institution o f criticism, and n o d o u b t a plurality o f intellectu al areas, is th at either you try fruitlessly to reproduce th at role o f the disinter ested intellectual, in all its various liberal hum anist guises, or you candidly recognize th at the role is now historically devaluated, it is past, and you try to do som ething else. T he problem is th at w hat th at "som ething else" is tends either to be a kind o f craven way for criticism, a kind o f technocracy, a specialized, professionalized technocracy which has ab an d o n ed any hope o f speaking m ore relevantly to a society beyond the academ y, or, as with the left, you try and w ork o u t som e o th e r kind o f sets o f functions for criticism. I d o n 't think criticism has solved th at problem yet, and as long as it d oesn't follow the p ath o f the left, I think it is actually structurally incapa ble o f doing so.
The role of the "disinterested" intellectual seems to have taken on a new function during the Cold War, or perhaps more properly, during the McCarthy Era, when Daniel Bell, Arthur Schlesinger and others were tolling the "end of ideology" and attempting to construct the university as an apparently value-free institution-one that repre sented no particular interest or point of view, but instead the "vital-center. "
A nd then in the 1960s, w ith the arrival o f a m ore heterogeneous body o f students w ithin the academ ies, cam e the breakdow n o f a com m on academ ic language shared betw een students and the academ ic com m unity-th at was the poin t w hen the interestedness o f certain ap parently disinterested acade m icians was dram atically exposed. It was also a period in which the com plici ty o f the academ y w ith m ilitary violence, w ith the destructive technologies, w ith the w ar in V ietnam , was clear to everybody. I think th at this is the crisis which we have inherited, and th at literary theory, in its contem porary leanings, springs o u t o f th at period. T heory d o esn 't simply h appen at any tim e in the history o f a discipline. It happens w hen, for w hatever historical reasons, there is a need for th at discipline to becom e self-reflexive: when, for exam ple, its traditional rationales have bro k en dow n and it needs som e o th e r rationale, w hen it needs to establish distance from itself. If it does that, as it had done in literary theory in the 1960s and since, if it becom es self reflexive and no longer takes for g ranted a range o f routinized assets b u t in som e way estranges them , th en it can have one o f two functions. O n the one hand, theory can sim ply reconfirm those practices, giving them an even m o re solid foundation. (I think som e o f the ra th e r de-gutted im itations o f m arxism and structuralism and o th e r fancy French products th at found their way into Britain and the U nited States have been precisely a way o f doing this by giving new injections o f intellectual capital to a clapped-out industry.) A lternatively, you can raise the theoretical question in a way th at will estrange those routinized practices to the poin t o f changing them . H ere we are talking less ab o u t the Yale School and m ore perhaps abo u t Bertolt Brecht.
Currently there is a move in the academy to return to certain roots of German theory-athough not the tradition of Brecht and the Frankfort School, but to the tradition of hermeneutics variously associated with Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, and, if it becomes marxist, Habermas. Given your own references to Habermas, we were wondering whether you believe that hermeneutics-a marxist hermeneutics-can resolve the double bind of criticism you have described?
As a prelim inary footnote here, as we begin to talk about G erm an and French traditions, I think th at it is interesting and som ew hat ironic th at the only role left to A nglo-American societies m ay be to serve as the m eeting p o in t o f those two uncom m unicating traditions. Since the French and G er m ans d o n 't seem to talk to each other, then we m ight have to conduct the dialogue for them . H erm eneutics is n o t as p o p u lar o r as discussed in Britain as it is in the U nited States, so I am always struck w hen I com e to the U.S. to find th a t it is aro u n d and very m uch discussed, and I begin to p o n d er the political context to explain w hy this m ight be so. I think th at som e reasons seem to be fairly clear. H erm eneutics, it goes w ithout saying, raises questions o f fundam ental im portance a b o u t in terpretation. It is also the case, how ever, th at there are form s o f herm eneutics which blend very easily w ith a kind o f m ild academ ic liberal hum anism in this country which, in one sense, while apparently raising every conceivable question and being very anxious to question-raise, never seem s to m e to raise the questions which really hurt, and I think th at m ay be one possibly accurate reason for the rap id ab so rp tion o f certain form s o f herm eneutics into the academy. I think th at there is a problem abo u t w hat herm eneutics is. Obviously it w ould be som ething o f a category m istake to say that, as m arxist criticism is produced, it is in fact a herm eneutics because, it seems to m e, if herm eneutics is a reflection on in terp retatio n it also engages questions com m on to a n u m b er o f different critical approaches. I think it is therefore ironic th at som e academics and intellectuals do seem to w ant to m ake o f herm eneutics, as it w ere, a third position o r a n o th er position, one th a t can only be explained politically in term s o f a rejection o f (or a reaction to) such critical positions as m arxism . T herefore, the first question one has to raise to a herm eneuticist, and we know th at they love people raising questions so I'm sure they w ouldn't be offended by this, is w hat exact status do you think y o u r discourse has? A nd I think one p roblem there is th at it is a discourse o f a high level o f generality, raising certain fundam ental issues ab o u t the act o f in terp retatio n b u t stan d ing at a ra th e r disabling distance from ways o f applying it in practical ways, bo th textually and politically. To raise yet a n o th er question: obviously h e r m eneutics has been politically in terrogated, n o t least o f all in the fam ous G adam er-H aberm as confrontation, and has raised questions o f ideology and o f the unproblem atic assum ption o f a tradition in which herm eneutics seems complicitous. But beyond these questions there is the question o f the politics o f history, the political im plications o f and assum ptions in, for exam ple, the recovery o f the past o r the recovery o f lost o r semi-lost m eaning. T h at is to say, it seems to m e th at the recovery o r reconstruction o f the m eaning o f past texts has to be a good deal m ore historical and political th an m ost form s o f herm eneutics one comes across seem to believe. I d o n 't see w hy it should be a paradigm for cultural studies. A nd I think th at in th at sense the a p p a r ently n eu tral m ethodology o f herm eneutics, which simply says th at we should raise questions about the m eaning o f the past and its relation to the present, can actually license a kind o f p ro g ram o r critical activity which continually swerves back to classical texts, which is continually interested in the relationship betw een past an d present, b u t only conceived o f in a particu lar way. Now here I'd like to m ake two points. First, there are, after all, o th e r ways o f relating the past to the presen t th an the m ost fam iliar ways o f h erm en eu tics. T here are the m ore dram atic and violent h erm eneutics o f W alter Benja m in, w hose w hole conception o f the relationship betw een past and presen t is m ore political, m ore apocalyptic, and certainly m ore historically urg en t th an m uch o f w hat one finds com ing o u t o f G erm any now. Second, although m arxists are o f course concerned to question the relation betw een p resent and past m eaning, I think for m arxists these are questions always subordi n ated to an o th er question-one th a t tends n o t to be asked by h erm en eu tics-nam ely, the question o f the future. T here is no view o f the presen t or the past for m arxism (or I think for o th er kinds o f viable positions) which is n o t u n d e r the sign o f a possible o r desirable future. In one sense th at m ay seem to be a strange thing to say because quite obviously the future, in a m aterial sense, does n o t exist. But then n eith er does the past. W hat I m ean is th a t in the m aking o f such relations betw een past and future, we have to calculate-in w here we are trying to get to in the first place. A nd it is this future-oriented dim ension which I find lacking, n o t only in herm eneutical thinking, b u t in m any form s connected to it. W hat I w ould w ant to say abo u t tradition now from a m arxist poin t o f view is how im p o rtan t a concept it is. Perhaps this is m ore th an stating the obvious. T here was, after all, in the great explosion o f radical thought and practice in the 1960s, and for all its futility, a valuable skepticism abo u t the very idea o f tradition which was som etim es all th at one was trying to break aw ay from . Thus a kind o f eternal "now ness" finds later resonances n o t in the euphoric o r hippie style, b u t in certain form s o f co n tem porary left talk which seem s to fetishize som ething called "present conjucture" w here, as it were, everything rests o n the roll o f the dice in the presen t conjucture. Williams said long ago, I think in Culture and Society, th at a society th at can live only by contem p o rary resources is p o o r indeed. And I think th at it is a structural effect o f late bourgeois societies that they m ust repress history, because they m ust suppress alternative form s o f history and also th at their history tends to be the history o f the sam e, tends to be the eternal re tu rn o f the com m odity in w hatever fashionably varied guise th at returns. So the first point would sim ply be to underline the vital n atu re o f the concept o f tradition for m arxists. "We m arxists," T rotsky once said, "have always lived in tradition." This o f course is n o t to signal the uncritical o r subservient relations o f tradition which one finds, characteristically, in conservative thinking. I think, yes, Benjam in's distinction betw een history, m eaning I suppose ruling class history and tradition o r an alternative sort o f histories, was very im p o rtan t to m e because it m ade som e sense o f w hat I think is a problem w ith the British left, w here there has b een over the past ten o r fifteen years a lot o f w orking class, labour, and now fem inist history, a lot o f work in alternative history largely stem m ing from the H istory W orkshop m ovement. Now, one o f the criticisms m ade o f th at m ovem ent is th at one can fall into the trap o f seeing tradition, o f seeing socialist o r radical trad i tion, simply as an alternative in the sense o f som e suppressed b u t u n broken alternative continuity which, as it were, " ghosts" official history. And I think that Benjam in's ow n thinking ab o u t tradition, abo u t the resources o f the oppresed, is a way o f breaking with th at m odel. Because I think B enjam in's tradition is m uch less an alternative, ghostly history which could be blocked out w hole and entire (as I think som e lab o u r historians and som e fem inist historians tend to think) than a set of, if you like, crises w ithin history itself: a set o f points o f confrontation, o f ru p tu re o r conflict, w here you can see the outline o f an alternative w ithout having to p a rro t it. His tradition is then the assem blage o f those m om ents which are always for him reassem bled and reconstructed according to the dem ands o f the presen t conjuncture. So I w ant to com e back to the "p resen t conjuncture" in th at way b u t th rough that different perspective.
On yet another related subject, we wanted to ask you about your view of rhetoric, again drawing upon your views in W alter Benjam in and Literary T heory. In W alter Benjamin, you equate rhetoric with deconstruction and, with references to de Man, argue that rhetoric has retreated from politics and social practice and become a demystifier of ideology that itself proves the " final ideological rationale for political inertiaIn Literary T heory, by contrast, you explicitly appropriate rhetoric for purposes of political criticism and an entirely different kind of discursive practice.
Would you comment upon these two different views of rhetoric in your recent work?
I think the ap p aren t disparity em erges from the fact th at there are different m eanings o f rhetoric and, indeed, I think the term is now certainly up for political grabs. Rhetoric is the site o f struggle ra th e r th an a received defini tion. T he rhetorical trad itio n itself is a set o f quite varied traditions and w hat I was trying to pin p o in t in the Benjamin book was really two, I think, quite politically incom patible notions o f rhetoric. O ne is the use o f the term to indicate discourse as pow er and perform ance and therefore as always conjunctural, as always inscribed w ithin institutions. T he o th er m eaning o f rhetoric, w hich since Nietzsche, is precisely the one identified in its latest form w ith de Man, views discourse as the play o f tropes and calls into question n o t only the possibility o f m eaning itself b u t indeed the possibility o f practice. T h at is to say, b ehind th at N ietzschean insistence, th at Nietzschean im pulse inherited by m any co ntem porary deconstructionists, lies a skepticism abo u t the very coherence, abo u t the foundedness o f the concept o f practice which cannot b u t be political. A nd again, this skepticism seems to m e a coded response to o r a polem ic against m aterialist theories o f practice. N ow it clearly isn't o u r poin t to stand, as som e m arxists have done, o n a concept o f concrete practice which th en is seen to solve all the p ro b lems. Clearly, practice is as difficult, am biguous, and m any-sided as anything else. I think th at one has to u n d erstan d the im pulse behind th at neo-Nietzschean attem p t to deconstruct practice which, w ere it successful, w ould spell the d eath o f any effective social transform ation. If w hat is being said is sim ply a kind o f therapeutic in terrogation o f certain over-simple, ra th e r fetishized, notions o f practice, th en I think th at m arxists and o th er radicals can learn from deconstruction. But I d o n 't think th a t this is w hat is being said. So I believe th a t one m ust re tu rn to a theory o f rhetoric which, while n o t for a m o m en t suppressing the problem s o f over sim plification o r am bi guity, nevertheless begins from a grasp o f the fact th a t rhetoric is indeed the nexus betw een discourse and power. It m ay be interesting to see reception theory, like all o th er contem porary literary practices, again having its roots back in the 1960s. W hat we are really saying is th a t readers d em and participation, ju st as w ithin th at climate dem ands for dem ocratic participation o f various kinds w ere clearly very strong. In o th e r w ords it is part, and in principle a g reater than usual part, o f the d eth ro n ed m ythology o f literature. A nd I think it w ould be interesting to trace the developm ent o f th at theory in the various institutional changes, I dem ands, and program s which are characteristic o f the 1960s. At the sam e tim e, I think th at one has to say th at n o t only has m uch stan d ard E uropean reception theory, an d A m erican reception theory for th at m atter, been criticized for positing a read er w ho is, very often, m erely a function o f c o ntem porary reading form ations and n o t a function o f the w hole political system as well. But it is clear th at we are never simply readers, th at we are never simply in the first place readers. N or can we p u t magically into suspension the rest o f o u r existence w hen we approach a text. T here is a danger o f a kind o f left-academicism there, which w ould seem to presum e th at the classroom , if you like, is the only place in which m eanings are constructed. A nd th at obviously has to be challenged. T he o th er problem in relation to the w ork o f left reception theories, which you have touched u p o n in yo u r question, is indeed the em phasis o n consum ption which can, from tim e to tim e, lead to a kind o f carnival o f consum erism o r fetishism o f the im m ediate reading conjucture. This can be ju st as narrow ly dehistoricized in its ow n way as the m ore stan d ard form s o f bourgeois criti cism. We are always m ore th an the cu rren t reading conjuncture. It is partly a m atter o f how far we exten d the w ord "reception." Now, a lot o f the epistem ological problem s raised in those argum ents are perhaps n earing a kind o f solution o r at least a consensus: for exam ple, I think the m eaning o f the phrase "the text in itself " is now one th a t m ost o f us w ould reject. It is clearly essentialistic. I think th at there are equally certain form s o f voluntarism o f reading and interpretation, apparently based on a plurality o f interpretations, which m ost o f us w ould also w ant to reject. So I think there is a certain am o u n t o f com m on ground here too. But after those explorations are over I think th at still one has to re tu rn to w hat is at stake for m arxists: the ow nership, o r at least control of, the m eans o f cultural production. T h at brings the focus to an im p o rtan t problem in being an oppositional critic. In one sense, w orking w ithin the academ y as an opposi tional critic you are always in danger o f being m erely reactive to cultural work, o r cultural phenom ena, produced elsewhere. And th at is structural to the academ y, how ever m uch you m ay rightly talk o f certain kinds o f cultural production w ithin the academ y-and such talk is m ore widely done in the U nited States th an it is in Europe. T hen there is the question o f w hen, for exam ple, we take a film tex t an d dem ystify it, o r w hen we take a literary text and do an ideological analysis o f it, o f w hether w hat we are doing is m ore valid. T h at is to say, w heth er such unm asking can reveal certain d om in an t m eanings so as to prev en t them from entering the general unco n scious unchallenged. A nd th at task is som ething vital, I think, which one has to defend. But at the sam e tim e it has its built-in limits and I d o n 't think a radical critic can in the end be co n ten t w ith th at task. We have to be talking ab o u t the production o f cultural m eanings, n o t only in term s o f artifacts b u t also in term s o f o th er form s o f p ro duction o f cultural m eanings. This is the long-range perspective. N onetheless, being an oppositional critic does n o t sim ply m ean som ebody w ho is in som e way involved in academ ia. It does n ot, in the first place, m ean som ebody w ho takes the already fashioned pro d u ct and subm its it to a certain reading, how ever necessary th at m ay be at the m om ent.
How would you respond, though, to the work represented by Bennett and others, and particularly to their argument that marxism shouldn't be concerned with questions of aesthetics or aesthetic value? Bennett says, for example, that "the object of marxist criticism is not that of producing an aesthetic, of revealing the truth about an already pre-established literature, but that of intervening within the social processes of reading and writing." I think th a t once one begins to argue w ith T ony B ennett, once one begins to unpack the m eaning o f a phrase like "the social processes o f reading and w riting," then one w ould probably find o n eself w orking w ith the kinds o f issues which have b een traditionally know n as aesthetics. If T ony Bennett spells his position o u t m ore clearly o r gives us a little m ore exem plary or concrete practice, then I think the sorts o f questions o r responsive devices and textual operations and effects th a t one w ould find oneself w ith in a properly political contex t-and th a t is the valuable poin t o f it-really add up to w hat people really m ean w hen they use the category "aesthetic." In o th e r w ords, I think there is a dan g er in B ennett's work, and in any w ork o f th a t kind, o f implicitly subscribing to a bourgeois n o tio n o f aesthetics and th en prop erly refusing it. J u st as I think there is a dan g er in m uch deconstructive thinking o f implicitly subscribing to u tterly u n tenable m etaphysical notions o f truth, o f art, o f presence o r ground, and then, o f course, piously going on to deconstruct them . Obviously one could play th at gam e for a long time. But the term "aesthetic" is, like m any such term s, too valuable to be su rren d ered to the opposition w ithout a struggle. I d o n 't think th at it is enough for a m arxist critic to say, all right, you have y o u r aesthetic dis courses and you can keep them , w e're going to do som ething else: call it politics, call it intervention in social processes o r w hatever. First o f all, I d o n 't think th a t the w ord " aesthetic" is th at simple. Very often in his work, T ony B ennett tends to equate the aesthetic w ith a certain founding m om en t in the history o f G erm an thought, G erm an idealism to be precise, and says quite p rop erly th a t this is clearly u n tenable and so we w ant to do som ething else. But the w ord "aesthetic" seem s to m e a m uch m ore indeterm inate and flexible w ord th an that, one which really tries to analyze the specificity o f w hatever it is th at is going o n w hen people say, as they tend to, th at they are responding to a w ork o f art, ra th e r th an w hen they say they are digging the g arden o r taking a ride on a bus. It dem arcates a certain kind o f social practice. Now o f course we know, and here B ennett and I are in agreem ent, th a t the boundaries o f social practice are historically shifting in the extrem e. O f course we w ant to reject essentialistic notions o f aesthetics, b u t the w ord aesthetic covers a m ultitude o f areas and responses and those, I think, cannot be abandoned. It w ould have been inconceivable to som eone like Brecht to say, well I'm really n o t concerned with the aesthetic value o f m y play o r poem , w hat I was really concerned w ith was w hether it was political ly effective. T o which the sim ple answ er w ould be: well, if it was boring, tedious, and badly done, how o n earth could it have been politically effec tive? T hose two questions for Brecht, o f the political and the aesthetic, simply w ould n o t have b een so disassociated. By the aesthetic he w ould have m ean t som ething like the p ro d uction o f certain kinds o f dram atic and tex tu al effects which m ade the political co n ten t o f the w ork acceptable, in terest ing, exciting, and thought-provoking to particular audiences. So w ith that m eaning o f aesthetic I think one is talking from a p roperly leftist poin t o f view.
One assumption is that you can culturally or politically activate texts that would otherwise be received in an apparently value-free or "disinterested"fashion. With other left reception theorists, such as Peter Burger, however, the assumption is that radical meanings are always preempted by conservative institutions. So, in a sense, Bennett's work represents an attempt to break with a certain defeatism or incorporationist view of texts and institutions.
I think y o u 're right. A nd I do think there is a way o f using left reception theory to co unter the m ost defeatist form s o f incorporationist argum ents because, as you poin t out, they surreptitiously assum e th at there is a stan dard o r fixed m eaning o r value to the institution o r the text. I very m uch adm ire B ennett's w ork in trying to b reak dow n those assum ptions. At the sam e tim e, I think I w ould nevertheless agree w ith Stephen H eath 's insis tence th at the arg um ent ab o u t re a d e r response o r audience response very rapidly settled into a kind o f unacceptable b inary opposition betw een, on the one hand, the magically fixed "tex t in itself " and, on the o th e r hand, as m any different readers as you have texts. A nd I think H eath was quite right to p o in t o u t th at this was really a pseudo-position. O nce one looks at the form ations w ithin which individuals are constituted as readers o r viewers then the purely voluntaristic gates are throw n open.
I think B ennett's case is useful in shifting accent u p o n the calculation o f textual effects, and so on. But at the sam e tim e, he som etim es pushes that to the point w here it w ould seem m ysteriously unpredictable w hat effects the text was likely to have in certain situations. I think it is at this poin t th at I would w ant to disagree with B ennett and say that, given the form ations within which readings are constituted, th ere is m ore predictability than som e kind o f pure reception theory w ould have us believe.
You have suggested that feminism represents today perhaps the most productive chal lenge to the dominant public sphere, particularly because feminism transgresses the boundaries of the academy and takes its primary impulse from a political movement embracing different groups aimed at countering a range of institutional practices. You have also argued that feminism is, in a very real sense, inseparable from marxism, or perhaps that marxism is inseparable from feminism, precisely because both speak from the margins of history, from a different tradition, and because both engage in a critique of power that is at once practical and theoretical. Given the partially sexist history of marxism, and given the marginality of both feminism and marxism, where do you see feminism in relation to marxist criticism today?
Let m e first ex p an d ju st a bit o n the fem inism and the public sphere idea. I m ean by th a t n o t only th a t fem inism is radical and does relate beyond the academ y to a m ovem ent, a w ider m ovem ent, and indeed takes its im pulse from it. But w hat I m ean by the public sphere m ore particularly is n o t ju st the public aren a or, as it were, publicness as such (which is a b ro ad er definition o f public sphere), b u t ra th e r th at area, th a t space, in which w hat we m ight perhaps adequately call politics an d culture com e together. I think th at it is as p a rt o f the classical bourgeois public sphere th a t m ediations exist betw een the public realm , o r the realm o f institutions, and form s o f subjec tivity th a t have their ro o t in the dom estic w orld which generates new form s o f subjectivity. T hese are, in H ab erm as's phrase, "publically-oriented" and th en pass over into the m ale-dom inated public sphere to attain se lf reflective form ulation. I think it w ould be very interesting to trace the changing relations betw een the public sphere, the dom estic sphere, and the stateparticularly for us as cultural w orkers, because culture seems to be the vital p o in t o f m ediation betw een public and private. A nd if one looks at contem p o rary fem inism in th a t light, th en w hat I m ean by it being an em ergent set o f elem ents tow ards a counter-public sphere becom es clear. It is concerned w ith problem s o f utility, relations betw een experiences o r m eanings form ed in the private sphere an d those form ed in the political arena. Feminism, as does the classical public sphere, grasps these problem s o f subjectivity in political term s and it does p u t an im p o rtan t em phasis u p o n culture in the sense o f language, experience, and so on, as p a rt o f a very necessary form o f it. So fem inism is on e o f a n u m b er o f elem ents, on e o f the m ost im p o rtan t elem ents, as one can already see in R aym ond W illiam s's term "em ergent," th a t contributes to the creation o f a possible co u n ter public sphere.
T he p roblem w ith talking ab o u t fem inism an d m arxism is th at in the E uropean co ntext th ere is often, at least, a certain assum ption th at fem inism an d m arxism , o r fem inism an d socialism, in som e way belong together. For all the real theoretical an d political differences, they inhabit an area o n the left. T hey have com m on interests w hatever the form al history th at links them . W hat little w ork I've done in th at area, m y book o n R ichardson particularly, really com es o u t o f th at kind o f perspective, which is then obviously very different from w hat in Britian began as "radical fem inism ." By radical fem inism I m ean th at form o f fem inism th at n o m ore sees any particular necessity to address questions o f class struggle th an do m any o th e r form s o f politics. W hat I w ould hope for is som e kind o f convergence betw een m arxists and fem inists which w ould n o t be a m utual appropriation, b u t which w ould be w orked o u t w ithin the sphere o f political activity; th at is, w ithin the realm o f trying to construct a counter-public sphere. A nd as is so often w ith theoretical questions and political differences, such practice w ould seem to allow for such clarification. I think th at one reason fem inism is so im p o rtan t to socialism, an d to traditional form s o f it, is th at socialism m ust be abo u t n o t only a h anding over o f pow er, b u t it m ust be a translation o f the very m eaning o f pow er. Any kind o f m arxism o r socialism th at stops before th at point, as in the post-capitalist bureaucracies o f E astern Europe, w ould be sorely distorted and disabled. I d o n 't think it is a question o f ceasing to talk altogether, as happens in certain fam iliar form s o f so-called participatory dem ocracy (w hether o f a socialist o r fem inist kind) because participatory dem ocracy is a form o f pow er ju st like any o th e r form o f pow er. T he task is to change the m eaning o f pow er itself-even to the p oint w here we could now, w ithin o u r presen t discourse o f pow er, be able to recognize o r identify w hat m ight pass for pow er in th at kind o f society. I think th at really is the goal and to th at ex ten t fem inism, if I m ight speak honesdy from a m arxist position, is a close rem in d er o f th at revolution w ithin the revolution which signals w hat is still to be done: it signals to w hat ex ten t the even productive political concepts o r strategic concepts are still in complicity w ith the kind o f rationality, the kind o f pow er structure, th at fem inism is ultim ately o u t to destroy. All o f th a t for m e is its m ajor im p o r tance. And w hat I have tried to do in the book on Richardson was less to w rite a critical study o f Richardson th an to indicate a way in which feminism, a certain kind o f post-structuralism , and m aterialism could com e together w ithout m utual appropriation. I believe th a t is possible. But I also believe th at it is fearsom ely difficult in the actual political arena, given the necessary vigilances and m utual suspicions th at now exist betw een socialist m en and women. O n the o th e r hand, one w ay in which these difficulties m ight be negotiated is by showing, if only at the theoretical level, th at som ething can be done which is n o t simply an appropriation, and th at has quite rightly been feared by feminists.
In the conclusion to Literary T heory, you seem to broaden the structuralist concern with decentering the subject by calling for a radical de centering of the object of literary criticism. To phrase this a bit differently, you seem to suggest the need to redefine the concept of literature in such a way as to transgress prevailing disciplinary boundaries. Could you elaborate upon what you think the effects of such a decentering would be, both in the academic institution and, at least potentially, in the public sphere?
I think it is difficult to talk ab o u t this now because o f the real, practical, short-term problem s involved in any radical transform ation o f the academ y. Certainly this is so in Britain, w here one always feels a sense o f incongruity in launching am bitious radical perspectives w hen w hat one is really w orried about is people's jobs, cuts in the stu d en t population, the savage cuts in funding, and so on. But I think there are different ways you can go in th at situation, different strategic ways. I have even h eard it seriously suggested o n the left, by a colleague o f m ine in Britain, th at w hat we ought to do is defend the concept o f high literature to the death against the philistinism o f T hatcher. And, o f course, one can u n d erstan d th at type o f thinking. I think th at it is the w rong ap p roach nevertheless because the pheno m en o n o f Thatcherism , o r its equivalent in the U nited States, is so challenging that, as radicals, we have to try to think it th rough to the end in o rd er to have the kind o f vision and energy to oppose it. I d o n 't think, how ever difficult the short-term negotiations are, th a t you can really oppose th at virulent form o f class society w ith anything less th an w hat you ultim ately desire. T hat is why I think there is a poin t now , if only strategically, in trying to w ork ou t w hat it is we w ould w ant in the end because th at w ould provide us with a set o f guidelines for w hat we are doing at the m om ent. A nd I think th at it does have to be a deconstruction o f the institution. W here I find deconstructive thou g h t m ost useful is in its approach to the question o f transform ing m o d e m institutions. I am very struck by the m anifesto, presum ably w ritten by Jacques D errida for the new ly founded College In ternational de Philosophic. W hatever the political difficulties, w hatever the m arginalization o f the academ y, D errida an d his colleagues really do seem to be w orking tow ards a deconstructed institution w here, as it were, the transgression o f boundaries, n o t only betw een subject-areas b u t betw een academ ic and social practices, w ould be built into the w hole institution. I think th at we have to find som e kind o f equivalent to w ork tow ard in the universities th at does in the end m ean the replacem ent o f the cu rren t divisions o f intellectual lab o u r by som e organized conception th at exam ines the effects o f all form s o f discourse in term s o f the pow er context in which they now exist. A nd th at will m ean som e new kind o f rhetoric, sim ply because o f the em orm ous im portance o f those signifying processes. It seem s to m e th at in a post-G ram scian era o f bourgeois society there is n o way to ignore the central role played by sym bolic processes o f all kinds, from advertising to the u ncon scious, in the rep ro d u ctio n o f bourgeois power. Curiously, in one sense the radical critique now involved in the cultural field is a m odest and m arginal presence-an d in a certain way th at is appropriate. But w hat is at stake, in the end, is the unlocking o f certain very pow erful, very unconscious form s o f signification and the construction o f new form s o f identity and the sub jects to go w ith them . T here is a sense, then, th at w hat we are trying to do now , if in a besieged and defensive way, is prefiguring a very im p o rtan t future. A nd I think one should p u t th at quite sharply by saying th at w ithout the fight on the cultural an d ideological fro n t it is unlikely th at we are going to be able to unlock som e o f those lethal arm ed struggles th at now politically and critically confront us.
